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¥»¥å·¥ç¥ó 6A  ¥ͥåȥ¥¯¡¦¥»¥­¥å¥ê¥ƥ£(CSEC)
Æü»þ: 2008ǯ7·î10Æü(ÌÚ) 13:50 - 16:00
Éô²°: ¥ݥé¥ꥹ
ºÂĹ: Ãݿ¹ ·Éʹ (KDDI¸¦µæ½ê)

6A-1 (»þ´Ö: 13:50 - 14:15)
Âê̾ ¥ۥ¹¥ȥ١¼¥¹Ä̿®´ƻ륷¥¹¥ƥà¤ˤª¤±¤ë¥¾ðÊó¼ý½¸Êý¼°
Ãø¼Ô *°ð°æ ½Ӳð, ÇòÀÐ ÌÀ (̾¸Ų°¹©¶ÈÂç³Ø), ʡÅÄ Íμ£ (°¦Ãζµ°éÂç³Ø), ¹Â޼ ¾¼Æó (¶ᵦÂç³Ø), ÌÓÍø ¸øÈþ (´ôÉìÂç³Ø)
Page pp. 1243 - 1251
Keyword ¥ͥåȥ¥¯´ƻë, ʬ»¶¥Êݸ, ¥ǡ¼¥¿¼ý½¸Êý¼°, ¥»¥å·¥ç¥ó¾ðÊóÍ×Ìó
Abstract ¥·¥¹¥ƥब½ÐÎϤ¹¤ë¥¾ðÊó¤ϡ¤µ¡´ï¤䤽¤ÎÍøÍѼԤξõÂ֡¤µóư¤òÃΤë¾å¤Ƿ礫¤¹¤³¤ȤΤǤ­¤ʤ¤¾ðÊó¤Ǥ¢¤롥¸úΨŪ¤ʥ¾ðÊó¤μý½¸¤äÊݸ¡¤´ÉÍý¤ε»½Ѥϡ¤¥·¥¹¥ƥà¤ò°ÂÄêŪ¤«¤ĸú²ÌŪ¤˱¿ÍѤ¹¤뤿¤á¤˽ÅÍפǤ¢¤롥Ä̿®¤Υ¾ðÊó¤òÍѤ¤¤ÆÄ̿®´ƻë¤ò¹Ԥ¦ÉʤǤϡ¤¥ͥåȥ¥¯¾å¤ÎLAN¤νÐÆþ¤ê¸ý¤䥻¥°¥á¥ó¥Ȥ´¤ȤËÀßÃ֤µ¤줿¥롼¥¿¤ΤȤ³¤í¤ˡ¤ÀìÍѥϡ¼¥ɥ¦¥§¥¢¡ʰʲ¼¡¤¥ץ¥֤ȸƤ֡ˤ¬ÀßÃ֤µ¤ì¤Ƥ¤¤롥¥ץ¥֤¬ÀßÃ֤µ¤줿¥롼¥¿¤òÄ̲᤹¤ëÄ̿®¥ѥ±¥åȤ±¤¬¼èƵ¤ì¤뤿¤ᡤ¥»¥°¥á¥ó¥ÈÆâ¤Υۥ¹¥ÈƱ»ΤÎÄ̿®¤Υ¾ðÊó¤μèÆϺ¤Æñ¤Ǥ¢¤롥²桹¤ϡ¤´ƻëÂоݤΥͥåȥ¥¯¤ˤª¤¤¤ƴû¸ÉʤǤϼèÆ¬º¤Æñ¤Ǥ¢¤ä¿Ä̿®¥ѥ±¥åȤ򤹤٤ƼèÆ·¡¤¥ۥ¹¥ÈƱ»ΤÎÄ̿®¤ξܺ٤òÇİ®¤¹¤뤳¤ȤòÌܻؤ·¤Ƥ¤¤롥ËÜÏÀʸ¤Ǥϡ¤´ƻëÂоݥۥ¹¥Ȥˤª¤¤¤ÆÄ̿®¤Τ¹¤٤Ƶ­Ͽ¤¹¤ë¤Ȥ¤¤¦¿·¤·¤¤´ƻë¥â¥ǥë¤òÁÛÄꤷ¤ơ¤¤½¤³¤ǹͤ¨¤é¤ì¤ë²ÝÂê¤Τ¦¤¤³ƥۥ¹¥Ȥ´¤ȤÎÄ̿®¥¤ν¸Ìó¤ËÃíÌܤ·¡¤¥¾ðÊó¤μý½¸¤ΰìÊý¼°¤òÄó°Ƥ¹¤롥

6A-2 (»þ´Ö: 14:15 - 14:40)
Âê̾ Evanescent Blacklisting for Automated Network Attack Mitigation
Ãø¼Ô *Erwan Le Malecot (Kyushu University), Pascal Jinkoji (Supelec), Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai (Kyushu University)
Page pp. 1252 - 1257
Keyword Blacklist, Firewall, Network, Security, Mitigation
Abstract 1. Abstract With a skyrocketing number of proposed services, TCP/IP networks have been adopted by numerous organizations as part of their infrastructure. Unfortunately, that diffusion quickly attracted the attention of malicious people and as a result, TCP/IP networks are now facing a massive and incessant flow of attacks. A large portion of this flow is generated by automated processes such as scanning tools and worms. To counter those attacks, system administrators usually rely on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) coupled up with the blacklisting of offensive hosts. However, that approach is showing its limits with the multiplication and dissemination of the attackers. In this paper, we propose to adapt current mitigation techniques to those new traits of attackers by associating a fading mechanism to blacklists. 2. Background In order to cope with network attacks, system administrators use active devices, typically firewalls. A firewall is a device that inspects the traffic exchanged by specified networks and, denies or allows the associated packets to pass based on a set of rules. The rules match selected packet attributes and specify the actions to perform in case of successful matches. Thus, by applying intrusion detection techniques, system administrators can gather lists of IP addresses corresponding to malicious hosts and then use firewalls to deny further traffic coming from those hosts (i.e. blacklisting). Still, this approach is showing its limits: IP addresses are increasingly assigned dynamically and reassigned frequently, attackers can forge suspicious packets seemingly coming from genuine hosts (i.e. spoofing), or simply can control many hosts (i.e. botnets). Consequently, blacklists should frequently be purged to avoid being overloaded by outdated information, and more importantly, to avoid denying access to previously spoofed genuine hosts. But, concurrently, attackers can also slow down their packet emission rate to try to evade such blacklisting mechanisms. 3. Evanescent Blacklisting Scheme System administrators are then confronted with contradictory directives as mitigating such slow attacks would require long term blacklisting, which is quite incompatible with the previously mentioned constraints. To deal with that rising conflict, we propose an original blacklisting scheme based on the use of random packet dropping as a way of penalizing initially blacklisted IP addresses while providing (mistakenly judged) genuine hosts a chance to pass traffic through the regulating system. The percentage of random packet dropping associated with an IP address, flagged by the system as potentially malicious, is to decrease progressively from 100% to finally become null after a specified amount of time. So a flagged IP address goes through several statuses, from fully banned to fully trusted again. If an IP address happens to be continuously sending malicious traffic, it is to be kept as untrusted, and thus will be continuously penalized. 4. Leads In order to validate the proposed approach and experimentally determine several required parameters, we started to implement our scheme using several Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) firewalling frameworks. The initial testing results are really encouraging so we plan to polish our prototype to finally deploy it on a live network portion.

6A-3 (»þ´Ö: 14:40 - 15:05)
Âê̾ IPSecÄ̿®¤¬²Äǽ¤ʥ¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹¤ˤè¤ëIPv6µ¡´ï¤ΰÌÃÖƩ²á¤ʥ¢¥¯¥»¥¹¼êˡ
Ãø¼Ô *¹õÌÚ ½¨Ï (¥æ¥ӥƥ寡¡¥æ¥ӥ­¥¿¥¹¸¦µæ½ê/ÀŲ¬Âç³ØÁϤ²ʳص»½ÑÂç³ر¡), °æ¾å ÇîǷ (¹­Åç»ÔΩÂç³ØÂç³ر¡¾ðÊó²ʳظ¦µæ²Ê), ²®Ìî »Ê (¥æ¥ӥƥå¯), Àи¶ ¿Ê (ÀŲ¬Âç³ØÁϤ²ʳص»½ÑÂç³ر¡)
Page pp. 1258 - 1265
Keyword µ¡´ï´ÉÍý, ¸ÇÄꥢ¥ɥ쥹, ¥¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹, IPv6, IPSec
Abstract ¶áǯ¡¤IPÄ̿®µ¡ǽ¤¬Åëºܤµ¤줿¾ðÊó²ÈÅŤ䥻¥󥵥ǥХ¤¥¹¤ʤɤε¡´郎Éʲ½¤µ¤ì¤Ƥ¤¤롥¤³¤ì¤é¤ε¡´ï¤ϡ¤µ¡´ï¥桼¥¶¤Υͥåȥ¥¯¤ËÂбþ¤·¤¿¥¢¥ɥ쥹¤¬ÉÕͿ¤µ¤ì¤뤬¡¤¤ĤͤËƱ°ì¤ÎIP¥¢¥ɥ쥹¤Ǥ³¤ì¤é¤ε¡´ï¤ÈÄ̿®¤Ǥ­¤ì¤С¤±ó³֤«¤鵡´ï¤ÎÊݼ顤Áàº´ƻë¤ò¹Ԥ¦¤³¤Ȥ¬Íưפˤʤ롥ɮ¼Ԥé¤ϡ¤ÁÐÊý¸þ¤Υ¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹µ¡¹½¤ò»ý¤ĥ¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹ÁõÃ֤òÍѤ¤¡¤¸ÇÄê¤ÎIPv6¥¢¥ɥ쥹¤òÍѤ¤¤¿µ¡´ï¤È¾¥Ρ¼¥ɤÎÄ̿®¤ò²Äǽ¤Ȥ¹¤ë¼êˡLTA6¤òÄó°Ƥ·¤Ƥ¤¤롥¤·¤«¤·¡¤¤³¤μêˡ¤Ǥϡ¤µ¡´ï¤ÎÊݼ顤Áàº´ƻë¤ò¹Ԥ¦üËö¤ȵ¡´ï¤δ֤ÇIPSecÄ̿®¤¬¤Ǥ­¤ʤ¤¤Ȥ¤¤¦ÌäÂ꤬¤¢¤ä¿¡¥ËܹƤǤϡ¤¤³¤ì¤é¤δ֤ÎIPSecÄ̿®¤ò²Äǽ¤Ȥ¹¤륢¥ɥ쥹³äÅö¤Ƽêˡ¤òÄó°Ƥ¹¤롥Ëܼêˡ¤Ǥϡ¤¥¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹¤Î¸å¤ÇICMPv6¡¤TCP¡¤UDP¥إåÀÆâ¤˴ޤޤì¤ë¥§¥å¯¥µ¥à¤ËÊѹ¹¤¬¤¸¤ʤ¤¤褦¤ËưŪ¤ʥ¢¥ɥ쥹¤ò³äÅö¤Ƥ뤳¤Ȥǡ¤IPSecÄ̿®¤ò²Äǽ¤ˤ·¤Ƥ¤¤롥¤ޤ¿¡¤¥§¥å¯¥µ¥à¤ν񤭴¹¤¨¤òÉÔÍפȤ¹¤뤳¤Ȥǡ¤¥¢¥ɥ쥹ÊѴ¹ÁõÃ֤νèÍýÉé²٤ÎÄ㸺¤ò²Äǽ¤ˤ·¤Ƥ¤¤롥

6A-4 (»þ´Ö: 15:05 - 15:30)
Âê̾ ¥»¥­¥奢¥ޥ륭¥㥹¥ȤÎÄ̿®Î̸úΨ²½
Ãø¼Ô *°Ëƣ δ, ÊÆÅÄ ·ò (»°ɩÅŵ¡³ñ¼Ò ¾ðÊ󵻽ÑÁí¹縦µæ½ê)
Page pp. 1266 - 1269
Keyword ¸°´ÉÍý, ÊüÁŹæ, ¥ޥ륭¥㥹¥È, Subset Cover

6A-5 (»þ´Ö: 15:30 - 15:55)
Âê̾ ¹½¾ÚÌ¡ǽ¤ò»ý¤ļÖÆâÄ̿®¥ץí¥ȥ³¥ë¤ÎÄó°Æ
Ãø¼Ô *µȲ¬ ¸², ¾®·§ ¼÷, Àî ¿¿ (¥ȥ西IT³«ȯ¥»¥󥿡¼), ÈËÉÙ Íø·Ã, ÂçÄÍ Îè, º£°æ ½¨¼ù (»º¶ȵ»½ÑÁí¹縦µæ½ê¾ðÊ󥻥­¥å¥ê¥ƥ£¸¦µ楻¥󥿡¼)
Page pp. 1270 - 1275
Keyword ¼ֺܥ·¥¹¥ƥà, ¥»¥­¥å¥ê¥ƥ£, ¥ץí¥ȥ³¥ë, ¹½¾ÚÌÀ
Abstract £±¡¥½ø ¶áǯ¡¤¼ÖξÆâ¤ι½ÉôÉʤˤĤ¤¤ÆÅŻÒ¸æÂоݤȤʤë¤â¤ΤÎÁý²á¤ ¤½¤ì¤é¤ò¤Ĥʤ°Ä̿®Éôʬ¤ˤĤ¤¤Æɸ½ಽ¤µ¤줿¥ͥåȥ¥¯µ»½ѤÎ ƳÆþ¤¬¤¹¤¹¤ߡ¤¼ÖξÆâLAN¤ϰìÈ̤Υª¥ե£¥¹¤ä²ÈÄí¤ˤ¢¤ëLAN¤ÈÎà»÷ ¤·¤¿·ÁÂ֤ȤʤäƤ­¤¿¡¥ ¤ޤ¿¡¤ITS¶ȳ¦¤Ǥϡ¤¼ִּÖÄ̿®µ¡ǽ¤Î¼Öξ¤ؤÎÅëºܤȤ½¤ì¤ò ÍѤ¤¤¿¸òÄ̻ö¸ÎÄ㸺¥¢¥ץꥱ¡¼¥·¥ç¥󤬵Äϵ¤ì¤Ƥ¤¤롥¤³¤ì¤ϡ¤ ³ƼÖ¼«¼֤ΰÌÃ֡¤®ÅÙÅù¤ξõÂ־ðÊó¤ò¼þ°Ϥ˥֥¥ɥ­¥㥹¥È ¤·¡¤¤½¤ì¤ˤè¤äƤ¢¤ë¼Öξ¤ϼþ°ϤμÖξ¤κ£¸å¤Îư¤­¤òͽ¬¤Ǥ­¤ë ¤³¤Ȥ«¤顤¾×Æͻö¸ΤβÄǽ¤¬¤¢¤ë¾ì¹ç¤ˡ¤Ãí°մ­µ¯¡¤·ٹ𤢤뤤 ¤ϲðÆþŪ¤Ë¸椹¤뤳¤Ȥǡ¤»ö¸ΤÎÄ㸺¤ò¤ͤ餦¤â¤ΤǤ¢¤롥 ¤³¤Τ¿¤ᡤ°­°դ¢¤ë¼Ԥ¬¸í¤ä¿¾ðÊó¤ò¼ִּÖÄ̿®¤ÇÁ÷½Ф¹¤뤳¤È ¤ǸòÄ̤òËãá㤵¤»¤ë¤褦¤ʤ³¤Ȥ¬²Äǽ¤Ȥʤ롥¸¤´¹¤¨¤ì¤С¤¼֤Ï ¼Ҳñ¤ò»٤¨¤륤¥ó¥եé¤ΰìÉô¤Ȥʤ俤Ȥ¤¤¦¤³¤ȤǤ¢¤ꡤÅÅÎÏÌ֡¤ Ŵƻ¸æ¤Ȥ¤¤ä¿ SCADA ¥·¥¹¥ƥà¤ÈƱÍͤΥ»¥­¥å¥ê¥ƥ£¤òµá¤á¤é¤ì ¤롥 ¤³¤ì¤ò¼¸½¤¹¤ë¤ˤϡ¤¼ÖξÆâ¤ËÅëºܤµ¤ì¥ͥåȥ¥¯²½¤µ¤ì¤륳¥ó ¥ԥ塼¥¿¥Ρ¼¥ɡʼֺܴ濫¤뤤¤Ï ECU¤ȸƤ֡¥ËܹƤǤϡ¤°ʲ¼ ECU ¤ȵ­¤¹¡ˤ¬¤·¤¤°տޤ·¤¿¥ץ¥é¥à¤Çưº¤Ƥ¤¤뤳¤ȤòÊݾڤ¹ ¤ë»ÅÁȤߡ¤¤¹¤ʤ綠¾Ú̬ɬÍפȤʤ롥¤·¤«¤·¤ʤ¬¤顤¼ÖξÆâ ¤ËÅëºܤµ¤ì¤ë ECU ¤ϡ¤°ìÈ̤ÎPC Åù¤ËÈæ¤ÙÄã¥꥽¡¼¥¹¤ʤâ¤ΤǤ¢¤ë ¤¿¤ᡤ¤½¤³¤ÇÍøÍѤµ¤ì¤Ƥ¤¤빽¾ÚÌÎÊý¼°¤򤽤ΤޤÞÍøÍѤ¹¤뤳 ¤ȤϤǤ­¤ʤ¤¡¥ ¤³¤Τ褦¤ÊÇطʤ«¤顤ËܹƤǤϡ¤Äã¥꥽¡¼¥¹¤Ê¿¿ô¤ΥΡ¼¥É + ¤ä¤ä¥꥽¡¼¥¹¤ò»ý¤ľ¯¿ô¤ΥΡ¼¥ɤ¬¥ͥåȥ¥¯²½¤µ¤ì¤Ƥ¤¤ë ¤Ȥ¤¤¦¾ò·ï¤ˤª¤¤¤Æ, ¤½¤ì¤éÂΤ¬¶¨Ĵ¤·¤ƹ½¾ÚÌò¼¸½¤¹¤ë ¤¿¤á¤ΥΡ¼¥ɴ֤ǤÎǧ¾Ú (Attestation) Êý¼°¤òÄó°Ƥ¹¤롥 £²¡¥ɬÍ׵¡ǽ Äó°ÆÊý¼°¤Ǥϡ¤²¼µ­¤δðËܵ¡ǽ¤ò¼¸½¤¹¤롥 ¡¦¼ÖÆâLAN¤ˤª¤¤¤ƳÆ ECU ¤ϡ¤¥½¥եȥ¦¥§¥¢¹½¤¬µö²Ĥµ¤줿ÈǤÇ ¤¢¤뤳¤Ȥ¬³Îǧ¤µ¤줿 ECU ¤ȤΤߡ¤Ä̿®²Äǽ¤Ȥʤë ¡¦³Æ ECU ´ÖÄ̿®¤ˤª¤±¤ë²þãâËɻß ¡¦¼Öξ¤ˤª¤¤¤Ƥϡ¤½¤Íý¤ˤè¤ê ECU ¤½¤Τâ¤Τθ򴹡¤³Æ ECU ¤Ë ¤ª¤¤¤ÆÅëºܥץ¥é¥à¤ò¤è¤꿷¤·¤¤ÈǤؤθ򴹤βÄǽ¤¬¤¢¤ꡤ ¤³¤ì¤é¤νвٸå¤ÎÊѹ¹¤ËÂФ·¤Ƥ⤷¤¯ ECU ¤ι½¤¬ǧ¾ڤµ¤ì ¤ë £²¹à¤ˤè¤ꡤ¼Öξ¾õÂ֤ò¬Äꤹ¤륻¥󥵡¼ÉéÄ̿®¤ˤè¤ë¥ǡ¼ ¥¿¤ΰÜư¡¤ECU ¤ˤª¤±¤ë²ù©¡¤¼ִּÖÄ̿®¤ˤè¤ëȯ¿®¤Ȥ¤¤¦¤ƤÎ ¥ե§¡¼¥º¤ˤª¤¤¤ơ¤²þãâ¤Ǥ­¤ë²Äǽ¤ò²óÈò¤Ǥ­¤롥 £³¡¥Äó°Ƽêˡ¤γµÍ× ¤ޤº¡¤¼ÖξÆâ¤Ç Attestation ¤òÀìÌç¤˹Ԥ¦ Attestation Master ECU (°ʲ¼ñ¤Ë Master ECU ¤ȵ­¤¹) ¤򿷵¬¤ËƳÆþ¤¹¤롥Master ECU ¤Ï ͽ¤΅Íê¤Ǥ­¤륻¥󥿡¼¤ȤÎÄ̿®¤ˤè¤ꡤ¼«¼Öξ¤ËÅëºܤµ¤ì¤ë²Äǽ ¤Τ¢¤ë¥Ρ¼¥ɤμïÊ̤ȥץ¥é¥à¤ÎÈǤ˴ؤ¹¤ë¥ǡ¼¥¿¥١¼¥¹¤ò »ý¤ġ¥³ƥΡ¼¥ɤϡ¤µ¯ư»þ¤˼«Åëºܥץ¥é¥à¤Υϥå·¥åÃͤò Master ECU ¤ËÊó¹𤷡¤Master ECU ¤ÏÊÝͭ¥ǡ¼¥¿¥١¼¥¹¤򻲾Ȥ·¡¤¤½¤줬 µö²Ĥµ¤줿ÈǤΤâ¤ΤǤ¢¤뤫¤ò³Îǧ¤¹¤롥³Îǧ¤µ¤줿¾ì¹ç¤Τߡ¤Åö ³º¥Ρ¼¥ɤËÂФ·¡¤Attestation Token ¤òȯ¹Ԥ¹¤롥³ÆÁΡ¼¥ɤϡ¤ ¾¥Ρ¼¥ɤȤÎÄ̿®¤˺ݤ·Ä̿®¥ѥ±¥åȤˤª¤¤¤Æ Attestation Token ¤ò¤Ĥ±¡¤³ƼΡ¼¥ɤÏ Attestation Token ¤ò³Îǧ¤Ǥ­¤¿¾ì¹ç¤Τß ¤½¤ÎÄ̿®ÆâÍƤò¼õÍý¤¹¤롥 £´¡¥¥ץí¥ȥ¿¥¤¥׻îºî¤ˤè¤ëɾ²Á ¥ץí¥ȥ¿¥¤¥׻îºî¤ˤè¤ꡤ ¡¦£³¾ϤÇÄó°Ƥ·¤¿¼êˡ¤¬£²¾ϤǽҤ٤¿µ¡ǽ¤òËþ¤¿¤·¤Ƥ¤¤뤳¤È ¡¦°ìÈ̤ËÉáµڤ·¤Ƥ¤¤ë TPM ¥åפòÍѤ¤¤¿¹½¾ÚÌËÈæ¤١¤Ʊ°ì CPU ¤Ǥª¤褽 100 Çܹ⮤Ǥ¢¤뤳¤ȡ¤¸¤´¹¤¨¤ë¤È 100 ʬ¤Σ± ¤ÎÄã¥꥽¡¼¥¹¤Ê ECU ¤ǤâƱÅùµ¡ǽ¤ò¼¸½¤Ǥ­¤뤳¤È ¤ò³Îǧ¤·¤¿¡¥